Lectures (Video)
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Putting yourselves into other people's shoes
- 3. Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
- 4. Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
- 5. Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs
- 6. Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot
- 7. Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing and voting on a line
- 8. Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization
- 9. Mixed strategies in theory and tennis
- 10. Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes
- 11. Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium
- 12. Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles
- 13. Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions
- 14. Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover
- 15. Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats
- 16. Backward induction: reputation and duels
- 17. Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
- 18. Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game
- 19. Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
- 20. Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition
- 21. Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game
- 22. Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing
- 23. Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education
- 24. Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner's curse
Game Theory - Lecture 10
Get the Flash Player to view video.
Lecture 10 - Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes
We develop three different interpretations of mixed strategies in various contexts: sport, anti-terrorism strategy, dating, paying taxes and auditing taxpayers. One interpretation is that people literally randomize over their choices. Another is that your mixed strategy represents my belief about what you might do. A third is that the mixed strategy represents the proportions of people playing each pure strategy. Then we discuss some implications of the mixed equilibrium in games; in particular, we look how the equilibrium changes in the tax-compliance/auditor game as we increase the penalty for cheating on your taxes.
Prof. Ben Polak
ECON 159 Game Theory, Fall 2007 (Yale University: Open Yale) http://oyc.yale.edu Date accessed: 2009-01-15 License: Creative Commons BY-NC-SA |
Lecture Material
To view the lecture material accompanying this lecture in a new window, please click the button below. If necessary, use the vertical or horizontal scrollbar in the new window to view more of the material or you can resize the window.
To download the above lecture material use this link. (Right-click and select Save Target As or Save Link As.)